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559 
MUTUALLY ASSURED PROTECTION: 
DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH 
AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Dmitri Shostakovich, a twentieth-century Russian neo-classical music composer, 
serves as an unlikely guide to several ongoing copyright law concerns: distinctions 
between copyrights and moral rights; the effects of copyright restoration to foreign works; 
and twenty-first century development of American copyright law. 
The framers of the Constitution recognized copyright’s importance at the start of the 
nation and enshrined its protection in a Copyright Clause with dual foci.1 First, copyright 
should provide economic motivation to produce creative works, and second, it should lead 
to general public enrichment through distribution of these creative works. Ultimately, it is 
this second, public goal that is central to any American copyright discussion, be it 
legislative or judicial. 
The past century or so has seen major changes in at least two aspects of copyright: 
duration and availability. An early American copyright was difficult to obtain, with 
onerous publishing, registration, and notice requirements—plus, once obtained, it only 
lasted fourteen years. In contrast, copyright now vests as soon as a work is created and 
lasts for seventy years beyond the creator’s life.2 
While copyright protects authors’ economic interests and financial compensation, 
moral rights protect authors’ personal, ideological, or idiosyncratic interests in their works. 
Thus, moral rights may include the right to oppose modification or use of the work in a 
way with which the author disagrees. Though long recognized and protected in Europe, 
moral rights are almost nonexistent in the United States. While an author has a cognizable 
claim in American court if someone has used his or her work without proper attribution or 
licensing—as this falls within the realm of copyright protection—the same author will not 
have a claim if the user has met all requirements but used the work in a way the creator 
disliked. 
America may hold strong in its refusal to recognize moral rights, but in the past few 
decades, it has reversed its long-held approach to copyright for foreign authors. Until 
1891, foreign authors could not secure U.S. copyrights at all; from 1891 to 1989, U.S. 
                                                          
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012). These seventy posthumous years alone equal five 
times the original fourteen-year term. An author who lives fifty years after creating a work would receive a one 
hundred and twenty year copyright—more than eight and a half times the length of a copyright under the original 
Act. 
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copyrights for foreign authors were possible but not practicable. Only after changes to 
American copyright statutes in 1989 and 1994 could foreign authors easily gain copyrights 
for new works. The same statutes also recognized American copyrights for previously-
unprotected foreign works whose home copyrights had not yet expired, in what was termed 
a “restoration” for thousands of creative works. This restoration yielded dual effects: it 
preserved the works in their original manifestations, but it also severely restricted who 
could use them. When users who had relied on these works challenged the restoration, the 
Supreme Court upheld it, demonstrating a new sensitivity toward globalization and 
international trade not seen in earlier copyright decisions but increasingly present in recent 
rulings. 
It is in this mix of protections, territorial disputes, and foreign affairs that Dmitri 
Shostakovich becomes an unlikely tour guide of sorts. Born in Saint Petersburg, Russia, 
in 1906—prior to the Bolshevik Revolution—Shostakovich was a musical prodigy.3 When 
his mother, herself an accomplished musician, enrolled eight-year-old “Mitya” in piano 
lessons, “within minutes, she recognized that she was dealing with a youngster of 
precocious musical ability, possessing perfect pitch and a phenomenal memory.”4 This 
ability served him well throughout his life: Shostakovich was a prolific composer with a 
fifty-six-year career, writing some fifteen symphonies, six concerti, and dozens of chamber 
pieces, piano solos, film and ballet scores, and choral pieces.5 
After the Bolshevik Revolution, Shostakovich’s interactions with the Soviet 
government were unstable. In 1936, after achieving success as a composer, Shostakovich 
was publicly denounced in the official Communist newspaper Pravda through two 
scathing anonymous editorials entitled “Muddle Instead of Music” and “Balletic Falsity.”6 
The composer then came back into the Kremlin’s favor for a time and, in his biographer’s 
words, was “elevated to the pinnacle of prestige in the world of Soviet music.”7 
 However, the government again censured Shostakovich in 1948 along with a number of 
other Soviet composers, and the composer’s tumultuous relationship with the political 
leadership of his country continued.8 Eventually, in 1960, Shostakovich joined the 
Communist Party and was elected the first secretary of its Composers’ Union. 9 When he 
died in 1975, any mention of his past run-ins with the Soviet leaders was conveniently 
absent from his obituary. Instead, eighty-five Communist Party members and statesmen 
hailed him as “[a] loyal son of the Communist Party, a prominent public figure and 
statesman, [and] artist-citizen . . . [who] devoted his entire life to the development of 
Soviet music . . . [and] to the struggle for peace and friendship among nations.”10 
Ideas of peace and friendship among nations notwithstanding, Dmitri Shostakovich 
and his compositions were pivotal in the struggle for meaningful clarification of American 
copyright law for more than sixty years. Beginning with litigation brought either by 
                                                          
 3. LAUREL FAY, SHOSTAKOVICH: A LIFE 9 (2000). 
 4. Id. at 8–9. 
 5. Id. at 347–61. 
 6. Id. at 84–85. 
 7. Id. at 156. 
 8. FAY, supra note 3, at 156. 
 9. Id. at 216. 
 10. Id. at 285. 
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss3/10
FORSYTH, MUTUALLY ASSURED PROTECTION_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  12:15 PM 
2018 MUTUALLY ASSURED PROTECTION 561 
Shostakovich himself or by the Soviet government purporting to act on his behalf, and 
continuing through a twenty-first century Supreme Court case involving music 
performance and questions of constitutionally protected freedom of speech, Soviet and 
Russian influence appears throughout recent American copyright case law. These cases 
considered in context demonstrate the tension between private rights and public use, as 
well as the varied personalities, power struggles, and human stories at the heart of cases 
and controversies involving the work of human creativity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright Theory, Policy, and Practice in the United States 
Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress 
to protect copyright: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 
Copyrightable works span eight categories, from literary or dramatic pieces to 
architectural works and sound recordings, in tangible form, regardless of whether they are 
published or unpublished.12 Regardless of what category a work occupies, the “creative 
spark” is fundamental for it “to be eligible for copyright protection at all.”13 Put simply, 
for copyright protections to apply, a work must have at least “a modicum of creativity.”14 
Copyright’s requirement that a work show some modicum of creativity is 
inextricably linked with copyright’s “idea/expression” or “fact/expression” dichotomy: 
while copyright protects a creative expression of facts or ideas, it does not protect the 
underlying facts or ideas themselves.15 The rationale behind this distinction is simple. 
While an author chooses the framing, order, organization, and description of his or her 
subject, generally he or she does not create the facts of the subject itself.16 Because the 
underlying subject or knowledge conveyed by an author’s original expression is not 
generally created by that author, “[a] reader of an author’s writing may make full use of 
any fact or idea she acquires from her reading.”17 In this way, the underlying knowledge 
and information within a creative, copyrighted work may spread freely throughout society 
while the creator’s unique personal expression of this information continues to exist 
without interference as long as his or her copyright lasts. 
At the same time that copyright protects individuals’ expressions of facts, it also 
provides economic incentives for individuals to share those expressions.18 Put in the 
most pragmatic terms, a copyright is a revenue source. It grants an author the exclusive 
right to “distribute copies . . . of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
                                                          
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 13. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS (2012) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT BASICS]; Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 198, 211 (2003) (quoting Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991)). 
 14. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
 15. Id. at 350. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217. 
 18. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
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ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” for the length of the copyright.19 Additionally, 
if the work is fixed in a performance-based medium, only the copyright owner may 
perform or display the work publicly.20 This limited monopoly allows the creator to earn 
money by sharing his or her creation with the general public, while the profit earned in 
this way serves as a further incentive for the creator to both continue sharing his or her 
creation and go on to create additional works.21 
Ultimately, American public policy underlying copyright protection is enrichment 
of the public sphere; benefit to the creator is a secondary, utilitarian motivation.22 As part 
of this promotion of progress, “copyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
by a work.”23 Since copyright only protects original expressions while leaving underlying 
knowledge expressed freely usable, and since the system only rewards creators monetarily 
when they share their creations with the public, American copyrights ultimately serve the 
public.24 
Copyright in the United States has a comprehensive statutory scheme.25 Currently, 
protection vests as soon as anything with the requisite “modicum of creativity” becomes 
tangible.26 No registration process or other formality, such as publication with the proper 
© symbol, is required for a copyright to vest.27 
America’s statutory approach to copyright has been constant since the Copyright 
Act of 1790 was passed during the First Congress.28 Common law copyrights have long 
been disfavored; in 1834, the Supreme Court wrote that generally, “[t]his right [in 
copyright] . . . does not exist at common law—it originated, if at all, under the acts of 
[C]ongress.”29 However, early versions of the Copyright Act granted statutory protection 
only to published works and allowed a few common-law copyright actions for unpublished 
works.30 The current Copyright Act, enacted in 1976, preempts the vast majority of 
common-law copyrights.31 As described by the Supreme Court roughly ten years after 
Congress passed the current statute, “the Act’s express objective [was to] creat[e] national, 
                                                          
 19. COPYRIGHT BASICS, supra note 13. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way 
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 22. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is 
not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”). 
 23. Id. at 349–50. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 198, 212 n.18 (2003) (“[Public and private] ends are 
not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue 
private ones.”). 
 24. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 26. COPYRIGHT BASICS, supra note 13. 
 27. Id. However, copyright registration is a pre-requisite for bringing litigation. 
 28. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. 
 29. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wheaton v. Peters, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663–64 (1834)). 
 30. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 1 (1976) (“Instead of a dual system of ‘common law copyright’ for unpublished 
works and statutory copyright for published works, which has been the system in effect in the United States since 
the first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory copyright from creation.”). 
 31. The primary exception is for sound recordings made before 1972. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss3/10
FORSYTH, MUTUALLY ASSURED PROTECTION_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  12:15 PM 
2018 MUTUALLY ASSURED PROTECTION 563 
uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory and common-law copyright 
regulation.”32 While a few exceptions may still be actionable under common law, 
copyright in America is predominantly a legislative creation.33 
B. American Copyright Duration and the Public Domain 
1. Overview 
Since the Constitution grants exclusive rights to creators for “limited Times,” any 
copyright eventually expires. However, this expiration date has progressively grown more 
distant throughout the various Copyright Acts. Early copyrights were relatively short: the 
first Copyright Act, passed in 1790, granted a term of fourteen years based on the date of 
publication, with an option to renew once for an additional fourteen years at the author’s 
choice.34 In contrast, the current rule provides newly created works attributable to a non-
corporate author copyright for the remainder of the author’s life plus an additional seventy 
years.35 Copyright duration has also changed for a variety of other categories of works, 
including those anonymously created, produced under work-for-hire arrangements, or 
previously published before the current regime.36 
When copyright protection ceases, a work becomes part of the public domain, where 
it is freely usable by anyone for any purpose.37 Supporters of this transition from private 
to public characterize the public domain as a “storehouse of the raw materials of creative 
expression, freely available to all.”38 Understandably, however, many copyright holders 
are not enamored of the system—at least as to their own works. This is especially evident 
when copyrights have strong associations with brand identities or major profit sources. For 
instance, Disney lobbied extensively for both the Copyright Act of 1976 and the 1998 
Copyright Term Extension Act, which were directly linked to the then-nearing expiration 
of copyrights in certain Disney cartoons starring its hallmark symbol: Mickey Mouse.39 
                                                          
 32. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). 
 33. For an example of a common law copyright exception, see Capitol Records v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 
N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that some pre-1972 sound recordings not copyrightable under the current 
Copyright Act qualified for common law copyright protection). 
 34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
 36. Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States, CORNELL COPYRIGHT INFO. 
CTR., http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm (last updated Jan. 3, 2016) (determining 
copyright length can be extremely difficult because of these varying categories and exceptions). Computerized 
systems such as the Durationator, under the direction of Tulane Law Professor Elizabeth Townsend Gard, now 
run complex algorithms to help these knotty calculations. About Us, LIMITED TIMES, 
http://www.limitedtimes.com/about (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 37. Laura N. Gasaway, A Defense of the Public Domain, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 451, 455 (2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. M. Matthew Stewart, How Mickey Mouse Controls Modern Copyright Law, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 18, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-mickey-mouse-controls-modern-copyright-law-disney-2016-11. 
See also Corey Doctorow, We’ll Probably Never Free Mickey, But That’s Beside the Point, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/well-probably-never-free-mickey-thats-beside-
point; Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse out of the Public Domain. Will They Do It 
Again?, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/25/15-
years-ago-congress-kept-mickey-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-they-do-it-again. 
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Currently, all works published before 1923 are in the American public domain.40 
Online repositories such as Project Gutenberg, which provides digital copies of public 
domain books, and the International Music Score Library Project, which provides digital 
copies of public domain sheet music, aggregate and catalog these works for unfettered 
use.41 Teachers and educators often use public domain works in their teaching, as they can 
freely reproduce and distribute these works to students throughout the years.42 
2. Alternative Copyright Licensing 
Creators of new works may choose to use alternative copyright licensing options to 
expand the reach of their creations and expedite their creations’ paths to the public domain. 
Creative Commons, a global nonprofit organization, is the leader in this alternative license 
movement.43 It provides a number of scalable alternative copyright licenses for creators 
to utilize, ranging from total waiver of rights to mix-and-match copyright protections at 
the creator’s option.44 Content licensed under Creative Commons may be distributed 
through any means chosen by the creator, and platforms such as Flickr, Wikimedia 
Commons, YouTube, Vimeo, and MIT Open Courseware are willing hosts for such 
alternatively-licensed material.45 Even large organizations may use Creative Commons 
licenses, such as New York City’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, which recently made 
more than 375,000 high-definition graphics of artwork in its collections publicly 
accessible and usable through alternative copyright licensing.46 Many academic writers 
and professors choose to license their books and teaching materials under Creative 
Commons to increase accessibility and decrease cost for classroom use.47 
3. Fair Use 
Even if a work is not in the public domain, teachers and other users may be able to 
use it through a safe harbor provision of American copyright law. This avenue, termed fair 
use, is statutory, and allows users to employ copyrighted works for “purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research.”48 Libraries and their employees also receive unique 
exceptions for some reproductions.49 
                                                          
 40. Hirtle, supra note 36. 
 41. PROJECT GUTENBERG, https://www.gutenberg.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2017); IMSLP/PETRUCCI MUSIC 
LIBRARY, http://imslp.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 42. Gasaway, supra note 37, at 456. 
 43. CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 44. What We Do, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Kelly Richmond-Abdou, You Can Now Use 375,000 Images from the Met Museum for Free, MY MOD. 
MET (Feb. 8, 2017), http://mymodernmet.com/metropolitan-museum-of-art-open-access. 
 47. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, CODEV2, http://codev2.cc (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Benjamin Peters, 555 
Questions to Make Digital Keywords Harder, http://press.princeton.edu/releases/m2-10696.pdf (last visited Mar. 
8, 2017). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012) (codifying that libraries and their employees do not infringe on copyrights when 
they make specific numbers of copies for specific purposes, such as preservation, security, or replacement of rare 
books). 
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However, reliance on fair use has some risks. First, it requires litigation to determine 
with certainty its application to a specific use. For a court to enter a finding of fair use, 
parties must first dispute the use—and copyright holders often vigorously defend their 
rights.50 As a result, what constitutes fair use is often unpredictable and dependent on the 
individual court.51 This can have a chilling effect upon educators and others who would 
otherwise utilize fair use’s safe harbor.52 
Whether a work is fully copyrighted, alternatively licensed, in the public domain, or 
used under the fair use safe harbor, tensions between public and private motivations often 
appear. Creative works are often personal to the owner and the owner’s reputation, while—
as will be addressed later—use of public domain works may become just as personal.53 
In any case, untangling the various rights and interests in a copyright case requires 
consideration of the people and motivations behind any particular use of works. 
C.  Historical and Modern American Approaches to Copyright for Foreign Works 
U.S. copyright law facilitates a rich public sphere by providing exclusive rights to 
authors in exchange for sharing the work with the general public. However, until very 
recently, these protections and exceptions applied only to works by domestic authors. Until 
late in the twentieth century, American copyright protection was difficult if not impossible 
for a work of foreign origin. Consequently, almost two centuries before Internet users 
started to commit digital piracy of music and movies, America was a willing and eager 
home to widespread “piracy” of foreign books and creations.54 
Congress’ first copyright legislation limited copyright to works by American 
citizens.55 It also expressly denied protection to foreign authors in a provision “as 
unequivocal as it was expansive.”56 Though international copyright agreements started to 
develop in the nineteenth century, the United States did not participate in them.57 Rather, 
as described by one copyright scholar, “[t]he United States deliberately stayed outside 
international copyright to benefit from its outlaw status.”58 Since foreign copyrights were 
not recognized whatsoever in nineteenth-century America, “[r]eprinting foreign works 
was not only permitted but encouraged.”59 Reprinting British works was an especially 
                                                          
 50. For instance, the James Joyce estate is notorious for its longtime resistance to scholarly use of Joyce 
materials. See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Shloss v. Estate of Joyce, STAN. CTR. 
INTERNET & SOC’Y, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/cases/shloss-v-estate-joyce (last visited Nov. 23, 
2017). 
 51. Gasaway, supra note 37, at 467. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See infra Part IV. 
 54. PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS 114 (2014). 
 55. ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS 21 (2013). 
 56. Id. Specifically, the Act stated that: 
[N]othing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting, 
or publishing within the United states, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published 
by any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of 
the United States. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 57. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 112. 
 58. Id. at 113. 
 59. Id. 
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widespread practice.60 
The economic ramifications of America’s refusal to recognize foreign copyrights 
were significant. American publishers paid no royalties and reaped the full profit of any 
international book they published.61 Both laissez-faire Americans and copyright-deprived 
Brits fiercely argued their sides: “the anti-piracy camp view[ed] reprinters . . . as 
‘gentlemen of the road,’ lining their pockets at the expense of helpless European authors” 
while “[t]he pro-reprinting contingent disagreed, hailing [reprinters] as a ‘kind of “literary 
Johnny Appleseed,” disseminating to a mass audience the seeds of literary appreciation 
and cultural revival.’”62 Ultimately, reprinting enriched the public sphere since the system 
increased the amount of literature and knowledge available to the general public,63 but it 
had serious problems because it economically challenged both American and British 
authors. American authors found it difficult to attract an audience in a marketplace flooded 
with cheap foreign works, while British authors received plenty of attention from 
American audiences but no monetary reward to compensate them for their time and 
effort.64 
Owners of foreign copyrights were understandably displeased with America’s 
freewheeling use of their creations. Thomas Hood, a nineteenth century British humorist, 
described American publishers as “Bookaneers” when he called for longer British 
copyrights in an essay entitled, Copyright and Copywrong.65 The struggle between 
America and Britain lasted throughout the nineteenth century, and “Congress was 
petitioned over a hundred times (from both sides) in the years up to 1875.”66 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, other countries coordinated to form the 
Berne Convention as a way to manage international rights related to publication.67 First 
established in 1886, Berne functioned without the United States for its first one hundred 
years.68 Despite the petitions from American and British authors and the movement 
toward international copyright agreements by other countries through the Berne 
Convention, America was steadfast in its protections—or lack thereof. 
While America was stubbornly not a part of Berne for many years, Congress first 
extended copyright protection to foreign authors in 1891, a short five years after the 
copyright convention’s formation.69 However, though protection for foreign authors’ 
works was then possible, it was rarely practicable: the foreign author’s country had to have 
reciprocity with the United States, and more importantly, the work in question had to be 
first or simultaneously manufactured in America to earn any protection.70 This American 
                                                          
 60. SPOO, supra note 55, at 24. 
 61. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 113. 
 62. SPOO, supra note 55, at 16 (internal citations omitted). 
 63. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 114. 
 64. Thomas Bender & David Samplinger, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American Literature, 29 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 262 (1996). 
 65. Thomas Hood, Copyright and Copywrong, in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS HOOD: COMIC AND SERIOUS, IN 
PROSE AND VERSE 91 (New York, Wiley & Putnam 1862). 
 66. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 117. 
 67. Id. at 11. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 122. 
 70. David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An International Copyright Proposal for 
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manufacturing clause was demanding. “[U]nder its terms, a ‘book, photograph, chromo, 
or lithograph’ was eligible for U.S. copyright protection only if ‘printed from type set 
within the limits of the United States,’ or ‘from negatives or drawings on stone made 
within the limits of the United States.’”71 Roughly two decades later, in 1909, America 
reinforced its manufacturing requirement for English-language works: “books now had to 
be typeset, printed, and bound in the US” to receive any copyright protection.72 With 
these requirements, “[m]any foreign authors simply could not comply with [the clause’s] 
strict requirements” and their works remained unprotected in the United States.73 
The manufacturing requirement almost disappeared in the 1930s, in an attempt to 
bring the United States into a place where it could successfully join the Berne 
Convention.74 However, this attempt ultimately failed, as “the Depression was an 
inauspicious moment to threaten the jobs created by the manufacturing requirement.”75 
Ultimately, America’s manufacturing clause stayed in place for almost a hundred years, 
until it was first weakened when America joined the United Copyright Convention in 1955 
in a step toward greater harmony with other countries in copyright matters.76 Continuing 
this more cooperative and internationally-minded course, Congress repealed the 
manufacturing clause in 1986.77 America joined the Berne Convention just three years 
later in 1989.78 
II. MORAL RIGHTS AND FALSE IMPUTATIONS 
In the wake of World War II and during the early stages of the Cold War, Hollywood 
produced a number of films intended to reinforce its support of democracy and stir the 
American spirit of patriotism. One of these films, Twentieth Century-Fox’s The Iron 
Curtain, provided the battleground for America’s first copyright law decision regarding—
and ultimately rejecting—the idea of moral rights. 
A.  Moral Rights and the Tension Between Creators and Society 
Moral rights, at their simplest, are an author’s rights to have an ongoing voice in the 
destiny of his or her creations. Unlike copyright, which addresses economic concerns such 
as proper compensation, moral rights address the more personal side of art. Fundamentally, 
“moral rights are based on the idea that an author is personally invested in his or her 
work.”79 “Attribution,” for instance, is the author’s right to receive credit by name for a 
creation, while “integrity” is often defined as the author’s right to “protect the work from 
                                                          
the United States, 55 L. & CONT. PROBS. 211, 213 (1992). 
 71. Id. 
 72. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 161. 
 73. SPOO, supra note 55, at 63. 
 74. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 214. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][2] (2015) (“The 
Universal Copyright Convention was created . . . to provide an alternative multilateral convention to Berne . . . . 
The United States was among the initial dozen states to ratify the U.C.C. in 1955.”). 
 77. BALDWIN, supra note 54, at 219. 
 78. Id. at 235; SPOO, supra note 55, at 63. 
 79. MIRA T. SUNDARA RAGAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 4 (2011). 
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harm.”80 In countries that recognize moral rights, these protections may last the same 
duration as copyrights (such as in Germany), or may extend without limit (such as in 
France).81 
France is the archetypal example of a moral rights country, as it has some of the 
broadest moral rights protections.82 Its expansive approach is largely due to the way its 
jurisprudence understands creative works as expressions of their authors’ personalities.83 
These expressions must “be preserved untouched.” 84 Because of this anthropomorphic 
view of art, French copyright legislation broadly protects perpetual and inalienable moral 
rights including attribution, protection from all modification and disclosure, and ability to 
stop distribution.85 
By placing the author at the center of the discussion, French law benefits authors but 
sets society and culture on unsteady footing, eternally susceptible to the desires of authors. 
France recognizes both “an objective right to integrity, which is the right of the author to 
refuse and to oppose any modification” and a “subjective right of integrity, which is the 
right to oppose the use of the work in a manner which does not conform to its spirit as 
defined by the author.”86 Both these rights make the author the final arbiter of whether 
another’s use of the work is appropriate. 
The American copyright system stands in clear contrast to France and its approach 
to moral rights. In the United States, only creators of some narrowly-defined and specific 
visual arts receive any sort of moral rights in their works, while creators of any other 
copyrighted work do not.87 Thus, in America, a copyright litigation decision rests not in 
an inquiry regarding the author’s personal feelings regarding the use, but in a court’s 
objective analysis of the rights of the public as well as those of the author—keeping 
pragmatic and economic, rather than ideological, considerations at the forefront. 88 
B.  Early Moral Rights in American Court 
Intended to “depict[] the Communist menace to American life and liberty,” the 1948 
Twentieth Century-Fox movie The Iron Curtain included music from Shostakovich and 
numerous other Soviet composers in its score.89 Producers specifically selected these 
pieces because each composer had come into conflict with the Kremlin for work that “was 
not seen as supporting the Soviet state.”90 Further, each of these works was in the U.S. 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. Id. at 15. 
 82. Id. at 236. 
 83. Andre Bertrand, Shostakovich and John Huston: The French Supreme Court on Copyright, Contracts 
and Moral Rights, in LANDMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR LEGACY 1, 1 (Christopher Heath 
& Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1–2. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 88. Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to 
encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.”). 
 89. Frank Miller, Review: The Iron Curtain (1948), TCM FILM ARTICLES, http://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/ 
79403/The-Iron-Curtain/articles.html. 
 90. Id. 
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public domain because America recognized no copyright protections for Soviet works or 
those of several other foreign countries. 91 
As part of The Iron Curtain’s credits, Fox included the statement: “Music—From 
The Selected Works of the Soviet Composers—Dmitry [sic] Shostakovich, Serge 
Prokofieff [sic], Aram Kachaturian [sic], Nicholai [sic] Miashovsky—Conducted by 
Alfred Newman.”92 In sum, the Soviet music used in the film filled forty-five minutes of 
the eighty-seven-minute-long movie.93 Shortly after The Iron Curtain debuted in 1948, 
Shostakovich and his fellow composers were nominally the plaintiffs in Shostakovich v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, an action brought in New York state court to 
prevent the use of their names and of their compositions in American propaganda.94 
While Shostakovich’s name appears in the style of the case, little information about 
his personal role in the litigation is available. Further, given that 1948 was the year that 
the Soviet state censured this group of composers, some scholars opine that it was the 
Soviet government itself that filed suit, acting “on behalf of” Shostakovich and his fellow 
composers in an attempt to suppress the American film.95 Soviet law included strong 
protection for moral rights at the time, and an action to get America to recognize them may 
have been an attempt to insinuate Soviet law into American jurisprudence.96 
Though the plaintiffs—whoever they truly were—conceded that the music was “in 
the public domain and enjoy[ed] no copyright protection whatever,” they alleged libel, 
civil rights violations, deliberate infliction of injury, and violation of moral rights as 
composers.97 Allegedly, the use of Soviet music in an American propaganda film 
indicated the composers’ “‘approval,’ ‘endorsement,’ and ‘participation’ therein thereby 
casting upon them ‘the false imputation of being disloyal to their country.’”98 
The Soviets were unsuccessful in their American suit. Addressing the libel and civil 
rights claims first, the New York trial court wrote that any alleged implication of approval 
did not exist because the work used was in the public domain.99 The court then turned to 
address “deliberate infliction of injury” and invasion of moral rights together. Without 
completely closing off the possibility of moral rights in general—writing instead that 
“[c]onceivably . . . the court could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or 
work[] in the public domain”—the court held that “there [arose] a conflict between the 
moral right and the well-established rights of others to use [public domain] works” and 
denied the composers’ motion for injunction.100 Under the theory that the Soviet 
government itself was behind the suit, it is not difficult to imagine that the “well-
established rights of others” included insulating American judicial resources from being 
                                                          
 91. SUNDARA RAGAN, supra note 79, at 143. 
 92. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. SUNDARA RAGAN, supra note 79, at 142–43. 
 96. See id. at 143 (“The moral right of integrity enjoyed strong protection in sections 19 and 11 of the Soviet 
legislation of 1928.”). 
 97. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 577. 
 98. Id. at 578. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 578–79. 
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commandeered by the Soviets. 
By contrast, the Soviet litigants had very different luck bringing their copyright suit 
over the same film in moral rights-friendly France. Rejecting the American approach, 
where moral rights were troublesome to apply and public interest became the deciding 
factor in favor of denying an injunction, the French court liberally extended moral rights 
to the foreigners and allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their claim.101 
The 1948 litigation over Shostakovich’s compositions was an unsuccessful attempt 
to broaden America’s authorial rights protection beyond the pragmatic economic 
protections of copyright to the more personal world of moral rights. While the plaintiffs 
accused the defendant filmmakers of falsely imputing disloyalty to composers including 
Shostakovich, ultimately the New York state court prevented the plaintiffs’ false 
imputation of moral rights into American copyright jurisprudence. Yet similar tensions 
between, on one hand, an author’s personal rights and interests in the integrity of his or 
her creative work, and, on the other hand, an author’s economic control over the way his 
or her work is used by the general public, would reappear roughly sixty years later, when 
Shostakovich and his compositions again occupied the center of a controversy regarding 
public and private interests in copyright law.102 This time, however, the suit moved 
beyond the trial level—all the way to the United States Supreme Court. 
III. RELIANCE, RESTORATION, AND RECIPROCITY 
The Berne Convention began to establish ground rules for cross-border copyright in 
1886, but the United States only joined in 1989—more than a hundred years later.103 To 
meet the requirements for participating in Berne, America had to do something it had been 
notoriously loath to do: extend “the same full term of copyright protection available to 
U.S. works” to foreign works from other Berne countries as long as the works were still 
under copyright protection at home.104 Congress implemented this new protection, 
commonly termed a “restoration,” through Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Act (“URAA”), passed in 1994.105 
One practical effect of Berne and the URAA was the sudden copyright protection of 
many Shostakovich compositions, which had not enjoyed American copyright protection 
before but which were still protected in their native post-Soviet Russia.106 As a result of 
copyright restoration, “all works published in Russia and other countries of the former 
Soviet Union before May 1973” received copyright protection and were consequently 
removed from the American public domain.107 This included more than 150 of 
                                                          
 101. Bertrand, supra note 83, at 4. 
 102. See infra Part IV. 
 103. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S 302, 306 (2012). 
 104. Id. at 306–07. 
 105. Id. at 306. 
 106. Works Restored to Copyright Protection, AM. SOC. OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, & PUBLISHERS, 
https://www.ascap.com/restored_works (last visited Nov. 23, 2017). 
 107. Golan, 565 U.S. at 353 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Additionally, “films by Alfred Hitchcock, books by C. S. 
Lewis and Virginia Woolf, symphonies by Prokofiev and Stravinsky and paintings by Picasso” all received 
restored copyrights. Adam Liptak, Public Domain Works Can Be Copyrighted Anew, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/business/public-domain-works-can-be-
copyrighted-anew-justices-rule.html. 
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Shostakovich’s compositions.108 
Restoration had several positive effects, such as preserving Shostakovich’s 
compositions in their original form for posterity and maintaining the integrity of what 
Shostakovich wrote. However, it also caused the cost of access for Shostakovich 
compositions to skyrocket—the price for musical scores increased as much as sevenfold 
for some of his works.109 For musicians, arrangers, and performers who had made free use 
of Shostakovich’s works while they were in the public domain, copyright restoration 
caused the potential for copyright infringement liability where none had previously 
existed. 110 Since copyright infringement can be both civilly and criminally actionable 
depending on the degree of reprehensibility, this change had significant impact on those 
who had used the previously public domain materials.111 
It was in reaction to this sudden change that a number of “orchestra conductors, 
musicians, publishers, and others who formerly enjoyed free access to works § 514 
removed from the public domain” challenged copyright restoration in a post-Cold War 
Supreme Court case styled Golan v. Holder.112 
The Golan plaintiffs were a subset of a group known as “reliance parties”: “those 
who had, before the URAA’s enactment, used or acquired a foreign work then in the public 
domain.”113 Of the numerous Golan plaintiffs, at least three were directly and 
substantially affected by restoration of Shostakovich’s copyrights. Plaintiff Richard Kapp 
had produced recordings of several Shostakovich works,114 while plaintiff Lawrence 
Golan had performed and taught numerous Shostakovich works through his profession as 
a music professor at the University of Denver.115 Further, “[Section 514 made] it 
infeasible for [plaintiff] S.A. Publishing to distribute its recording of Shostakovich’s String 
Quartets, which was recorded at substantial expense and named by Time Magazine in 1991 
as one of the best recordings in classical music.”116 
In Golan, the plaintiffs alleged that copyright restoration violated the constitutional 
requirement of limited-duration copyrights, arguing that works in the public domain may 
not be removed from the public domain.117 However, the petitioners did not succeed: the 
Supreme Court, in a six-to-two decision with one abstention, affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision that Section 514 was constitutional.118 
Regarding constitutional limitations on copyright duration, the arguments made by 
                                                          
 108. Works Restored to Copyright Protection, AM. SOC. OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, & PUBLISHERS, 
https://www.ascap.com/restored_works (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (select “Shostakovich, Dmitry [sic]” under 
the “Choose a Composer” query; then select “All Years” under the “Choose a Year” query and click “Find 
Restored Work”). 
 109. Golan, 565 U.S. at 353 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 307. 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) (civil infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (criminal infringement). 
 112. Golan, 565 U.S. at 307. 
 113. Id. at 316. 
 114. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 115. Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2423674. 
 116. Id. at 11. 
 117. Golan, 565 U.S. at 307. Additionally, petitioners alleged that Section 514 violated First Amendment 
protections by restricting freedom of expression through its restored protection of the now-copyrighted works, 
an argument that was also ultimately unsuccessful. Id. 
 118. Id. at 307–08. 
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the Golan petitioners were much the same as those brought by ultimately-unsuccessful 
petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft ten years earlier in opposition to the Copyright Term 
Extension Act (“CTEA”).119 In both Eldred and Golan, the challenging parties asserted 
that modifying copyright terms—to add an additional twenty years’ protection to existing 
copyrights in Eldred or to restore protection to previously-public domain works in 
Golan—violated the “limited Times” provision of constitutional copyright protection.120 
In both cases, the Court rejected the “command that a time prescription, once set, becomes 
forever ‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable.’”121 Rather, because copyrights under both the CTEA and 
Section 514 still had a fixed end date—regardless of how distant that fixed end date might 
be—they stayed within the constitutional limits.122 
In Eldred, the Court cited to congressional reports that increased “human longevity” 
and “rapid growth in communications media” rendered the older, shorter system of 
copyright terms inadequate motivation for creators.123 Congress’ sensitivity toward 
longer lifespans reflected the so-called rule of the three generations: a longstanding 
copyright justification that “one’s children—and perhaps their children—might also 
benefit from one’s posthumous popularity.”124 This sort of legacy is evident in 
Shostakovich’s family, which currently extends at least to the third generation. The 
composer’s son, Maxim, is an orchestra conductor; Maxim’s son Dmitri is a pianist; and 
the two of them have been known to perform and record the elder Dmitri’s 
compositions.125 As creators and their family members live longer, the Court in Eldred 
seemed to say, it was constitutionally permissible that copyrights also live longer to 
provide the same effective amount of protection as before. 
The Golan Court moved beyond Eldred’s familial timelines and instead addressed 
modern globalization concerns and multinational interactions when it ruled that copyright 
restoration was constitutional. Though the Court conceded that Congress could 
theoretically extend copyright terms in installments with the result of perpetual copyrights, 
it held that this concern did not apply to restoration. Instead, it looked to the past, rather 
than the future, and focused on evening out previous inequities: “In aligning the United 
States with other nations bound by the Berne Convention, and thereby according equitable 
treatment to once disfavored foreign authors, Congress can hardly be charged with a design 
to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual copyrights.”126 In other words, the Golan 
Court viewed Congress’ copyright restoration as less of a bid for extra time and more of a 
reparation for America’s prickly treatment of foreign authors during the nineteenth and 
most of the twentieth century. 
The Golan Court did not believe restoration would create a new copyright free-for-
all. Instead, the URAA limited copyright restoration to three categories: works from 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 317–18. 
 120. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003); Golan, 565 U.S. at 317. 
 121. Golan, 565 U.S. at 317 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199). 
 122. Id. at 319–20. 
 123. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n.14. 
 124. Id. 
 125. I MUSICI DE MONTREAL, SHOSTAKOVICH: CONCERTO NO. 1, OP. 35/CHAMBER SYMPHONY OP. 110A 
(Chandos Records 1992) (Maxim Shostakovich, conductor; Dmitri Shostakovich, Jr., pianist). 
 126. Golan, 565 U.S. at 319–20. 
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countries without copyright recognition from the United States at the time of publication; 
sound recordings made before 1972; and works whose copyrights were lost due to failure 
to comply with formalities and technicalities.127 If the work had already entered the 
public domain in its home country, Section 514 provided no new American copyright 
protection.128 Nor did Section 514 give retroactive copyright protection for the years 
before its enactment.129 Because of this, the Court concluded that restored works “enjoy 
fewer total years of exclusivity than do their U.S. counterparts.” 130 
While copyright restoration limited the Golan plaintiffs’ previously-unrestricted use 
of restored works, it did not completely foreclose use. Restoration both prevented 
retroactive allegations of infringement and provided a one-year safe harbor from the time 
of Section 514’s passage for free use of any restored works.131 Further, if a restored 
copyright’s owner intended to enforce the copyright, Section 514 required the owner to 
notify any reliance parties of its intent.132 Reliance parties then had an additional twelve-
month grace period “to sell off previously manufactured stock, perform or display the 
relevant work publicly, or authorize others to conduct these activities.”133 Once the grace 
period ended, a reliance party would then either pay “reasonable compensation” to the 
copyright owner or cease using the restored work.134 
While the stated legislative intent behind copyright restoration was to place foreign 
works in the position they would have enjoyed had America recognized their copyrights 
in the first place,135 international issues were also influential—including a post-Cold War 
Russian element. However, the Supreme Court made only passing reference to these 
international concerns in its decision, writing that “The Register of Copyrights . . . reported 
‘questions’ from Turkey, Egypt, and Austria[, while] Thailand and Russia balked at 
protecting U.S. works, copyrighted here but in those countries’ public domains, until the 
United States reciprocated with respect to their authors’ works.”136 
The circuit decision below in Golan included greater detail regarding international 
concerns when Congress enacted copyright restoration. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit 
noted the Executive Director and General Counsel of the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance testified at joint hearings prior to the passage of Section 514 and asserted 
that “the Russian government . . . made clear that it [would] provide retroactive protection 
for ‘works’ only if the U.S. reciprocate[d] with retroactive protection for Russian 
works.”137 The circuit court decision also included detail regarding the Chairman and 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 307. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Golan, 565 U.S. at 316. 
 132. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38B: COPYRIGHT RESTORATION UNDER THE URAA, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38b.pdf. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Golan, 565 U.S. at 316. 
 136. Id. at 311 (internal citation omitted). 
 137. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions: Joint Hearing on H.R. 
4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America’s testimony during Congressional 
joint hearings that “the Russians simply said to the United States negotiators . . . that they 
will interpret their obligations on retroactivity in exactly the same manner that the United 
States interprets its obligations.”138 In these industry experts’ estimation, then, it seemed 
that mutually assured protection was the only way for America and Russia to make 
progress in the copyright arena.139 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, dissented from the Golan majority and would 
have found copyright restoration unconstitutional based on the utilitarian underpinnings 
of American copyright protection.140 Central to their discussion was Thomas Jefferson’s 
and James Madison’s “great uncertainty as to whether the Constitution should authorize 
the grant of copyrights and patents at all, [as] ‘the benefit even of limited monopolies is 
too doubtful’ to warrant anything other than their ‘suppression.’”141 Justice Breyer also 
placed great weight on the conclusion that “text, history, and precedent demonstrate that 
the Copyright Clause places great value on the power of copyright to elicit new 
production.”142 Since Section 514 rewarded creators whose creations were already shared 
with the public, rather than encouraging new art, Breyer concluded, the legislation at issue 
did not further the aims of copyright law.143 
The two dissenting justices also expressed great concern about removing works from 
the public domain, largely because such removal “reverse[d] the payment expectations of 
those who used, or intended to use, works that they thought belonged to them.”144 Also, 
in the dissenting justices’ opinions, Section 514 ran afoul of the First Amendment because, 
“[b]y removing material from the public domain, the statute, in literal terms, ‘abridges’ a 
preexisting freedom to speak.”145 
Justice Breyer’s dissent briefly discussed Berne and the URAA, but only to the 
extent of calling the legislation in question “a dilemma of the Government’s own making” 
because Congress failed to reserve public domain works from inclusion during URAA 
negotiations.146 However, the dissent did not address the reciprocity consideration the 
                                                          
103d Cong., 2d Sess., 249 n.2 (1994) (quoted in Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
 138. Id. at 291 (quoted in Golan, 609 F.3d at 1088). 
 139. Perhaps Congress recognized the benefit in reciprocal copyright protection between the United States and 
Russia in part because both countries heavily utilize the other’s cultural exports. Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky, a 
Russian who predated Shostakovich by roughly half a century, composed both the Christmastime favorite The 
Nutcracker and rousing 1812 Overture, often played on the Fourth of July. See Sarah Begley & Julia Lull, How 
The Nutcracker Colonized American Ballet, TIME (Dec. 24, 2014), http://time.com/3640792/nutcracker-
american-history; Everett Evans, How Did the 1812 Overture Become A Fourth Tradition?, HOUS. CHRON. (June 
29, 2012), http://www.chron.com/entertainment/article/How-did-the-1812-Overture-become-a-Fourth-
3674377.php (discussing the “sheer popularity” of Tchaikovsky’s compositions in America). At the same time, 
current American music has a large presence in Russia, where Taylor Swift and Nick Jonas rank in some top 100 
song charts as reported by music website Shazam. Russia Top 100, SHAZAM, http://www.shazam.com/charts/top-
100/russia (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 140. Golan, 565 U.S. at 349 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 348 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 443 (J. Boyd ed., 1956)). 
 142. Id. at 351. 
 143. Id. at 347. 
 144. Id. at 357. 
 145. Golan, 565 U.S. at 358. 
 146. Id. at 365. 
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Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court majority both emphasized. Instead, Justice Breyer 
focused on the internal mechanisms Congress could have put into place to avoid granting 
restoration.147 In short, while the dissent addressed the utilitarian and economic intent 
behind copyright law, it did not address the pragmatic issues of an increasingly global 
intellectual property market, nor did it address the foreign relations considerations linked 
to those issues. 
In a significant swing away from America’s longstanding refusal to grant foreign 
works protection, Congress approved America’s entry into the Berne Convention just over 
a hundred years after the international group first coalesced. This move allowed foreign 
works such as those composed by Shostakovich to receive copyright protections in 
exchange for the goal of securing Americans’ rights in other countries.148 Approximately 
sixty years after the Shostakovich decision denied any claim asserted by the man himself, 
or his country acting in his name, Golan affirmed restrictions on use of Shostakovich’s 
compositions and enabled his heirs to benefit from the rule of the three generations through 
copyright restoration. 
IV. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Supreme Court’s 2012 Golan decision demonstrated an ongoing change in the 
way American courts approach copyright for foreign works or foreign authors. As 
previously discussed, until 1891, foreign works received no copyright protection 
whatsoever in America.149 With the 1989 membership in the Berne Convention and 1994 
passage of the URAA, the “landscape” of American copyright recognition for foreign 
works changed.150 Shortly after Golan, in a 2013 case between a single plaintiff and an 
international textbook publishing conglomerate, the Supreme Court gave additional 
recognition to some foreign works—further broadening the scope of American 
international copyright protections.151 Yet, while the Court has become increasingly 
friendly to longer copyrights and foreign copyright owners, it has recently reaffirmed in 
no uncertain terms that moral rights are not a facet of American copyright protection. 
A.  Morals Rights’ Current Status 
While, in Golan, the Court took a far more expansive view of international copyright 
than America historically has exhibited, it still has its limits—and those limits include a 
firm denial of the concept of moral rights. The landmark case reaffirming the lack of moral 
                                                          
 147. Id. 
 148. Ironically, Russia was not so cooperative when it came time to actually effect protection. When it joined 
Berne around the same time as America, Russia enacted a reservation that prevented restoration for foreign works 
in the Russian public domain. Berne Notification No. 162: Accession by the Russian Federation, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (Dec. 13, 1994), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_ 
162.html. This reservation stayed in place until January 2013. Berne Notification No. 258: Notification by the 
Russian Federation of Withdrawal of Declaration Concerning Article 18 of the Paris Act, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_ 
258.html. 
 149. Golan, 565 U.S. at 309. 
 150. See id. at 312. 
 151. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
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rights in American copyright law is Dastar v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film, a 2003 
Supreme Court case that serves as a direct successor to Shostakovich’s 1948 district court 
lawsuit. At the center of the Dastar dispute was a 1949 television series based on Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s written memoir of World War II.152 Though copyright holders renewed 
the copyright on the written memoir, as was necessary at the time, copyright owners for 
the television series failed to re-up their protection, and the series became part of the 
American public domain in 1977.153 Shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the end of 
World War II, the Dastar company purchased tapes of the original television series, made 
minor modifications such as a new opening and narrated chapter introductions, and sold 
the videos as a set called “World War II Campaigns in Europe.”154 Copyright holders for 
the still-protected written memoir and other versions of the television series then brought 
suit against Dastar, alleging both copyright infringement of the original book and 
violations of the Lanham Act, which “prevents the unaccredited copying of a 
[trademarked] work.”155 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia rejected the copyright holders’ claims 
regarding plagiarism or infringement. In discussing the three main types of intellectual 
property—copyright, trademarks, and patents—the Court wrote that the right to “copy 
without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose 
patent has expired]—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when 
patented—passes to the public.”156 This exchange, the Court explained, is part of the 
“carefully crafted bargain” that copyright protects between a creator and the public.157 
Once the copyright holder’s rights expire at the end of protection, the limited monopoly 
that once existed disappears and “the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution”—even to the extent of plagiarizing it.158 
Dastar’s holding reached the same legal conclusion as Shostakovich fifty-five years 
earlier: when a work is in the public domain, the public has the right to make any use of it 
whatsoever, free from interference by the former owners.159 However, Dastar also 
widened the reach of this doctrine. In Shostakovich, a trial-level New York state court 
denied moral rights protections for the plaintiffs but left the door open for possible moral 
rights protections in the future, noting that, “[c]onceivably, under the doctrine of Moral 
Right the court could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or work, in the 
public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the author’s rights.”160 The 
Supreme Court in Dastar, though, closed the door to any sort of moral rights in the United 
States when it stated the bright line rule “under which, once [a] patent or copyright 
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without 
                                                          
 152. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23, 25–26 (2003). 
 153. Id. at 25. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 24–25. 
 156. Id. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)). 
 157. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 34; Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
 160. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578. 
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attribution.”161 While in recent years Congress and the Court may have taken a far more 
global view of copyright protection than America historically has demonstrated, as shown 
by the repeal of the Copyright Act’s manufacturing clause and the wide foreign and 
international protections granted by Eldred and Golan since 2000, the majority of 
American copyright protections still protect exactly that: copyright, not moral rights.162 
Golan’s dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Alito, would later 
invoke Dastar in its reasoning.163 Specifically, the dissenting justices used Dastar’s 
statement that, “[t]he right to copy . . . once a copyright has expired . . . passes to the 
public.”164 The Golan majority tacitly distinguished Dastar by underscoring that “[w]orks 
that have fallen into the public domain after the expiration of a full copyright term—either 
in the United States or the country of origin—receive no further protection under § 
514.”165 Instead, Section 514 only removed works from the public domain that, under 
Berne and the URAA, should never have been there in the first place.166 
B.  International Copyright Sales and the First Sale Doctrine 
Roughly a decade after Dastar, and only a year after Golan, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated its increasingly-generous attitude toward U.S. copyright protection beyond 
American shores in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. 
The first sale doctrine allows a copyrighted work, once lawfully sold, to be 
transferred in whatever way its new owner intends.167 For instance, someone who buys a 
book may then loan that book to a friend, or the owner of a DVD may resell it at a garage 
sale. The controversy in Kirtsaeng involved a much broader geographical area than the 
boundaries of a garage sale, though, as there the Court considered whether the first sale 
doctrine applied to foreign-manufactured works.168 
American textbook producers often publish English-language versions of their 
books in foreign countries, which are usually significantly less expensive than—but 
otherwise essentially equivalent to—their American-marketed counterparts.169 These 
foreign copies “state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the United 
States.” 170 Despite this warning statement, Kirtsaeng made a fairly lucrative business of 
purchasing these books through his friends and family in Thailand and then reselling them 
in the United States at a profit.171 Once American textbook company John Wiley & Sons 
became aware of Kirtsaeng’s scheme, it brought a copyright infringement suit against him, 
alleging that “Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation of its books and his later resale of 
                                                          
 161. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Golan, 565 U.S. at 358 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 524 (2013). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 525–26. 
 170. Id. at 525. 
 171. Id. at 526. One might say Kirtsaeng was a modern-day “bookaneer” in the style of Thomas Hood’s 
copyright wrongdoers. 
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those books amounted to an infringement of Wiley’s . . . exclusive right to distribute as 
well as [the] related import prohibition.”172 
Wiley pushed for a geographic reading of the first sale doctrine, arguing that it 
applied to sales “where the Copyright Act is applicable.”173 In other words, the doctrine 
should only protect the resale of works originally sold within the United States. However, 
the six-to-three Court sided with Kirtsaeng and took a broader, non-geographical 
approach.174 Comparing books with numerous other commercial products, such as cars, 
calculators, and computers, the Court reasoned that “[m]any of these items are made 
abroad with the American copyright holder’s permission and then sold and imported . . . 
to the United States.”175 If the first sale doctrine did not apply to foreign-produced works, 
the Court reasoned, both domestic and foreign sellers would be subject “to the disruptive 
impact of the threat of infringement suits.”176 
The Court bolstered its non-geographical reading of the first sale doctrine with 
several other elements of current copyright jurisprudence. First, it explained that “the 
[Copyright] Act itself says that works ‘subject to protection under this title’ include 
unpublished works ‘without regard to the nationality or domicile of the author,’ and works 
‘first published’ in any one of the nearly 180 nations that have signed a copyright treaty 
with the United States.”177 In other words, the statutory plain language led to a non-
geographic reading of the first sale doctrine. The Court also underscored the liberality of 
the current Copyright Act in comparison to earlier versions of the statute, with emphasis 
that the current law “phase[d] out” the manufacturing clause that previously restricted 
foreign publications’ American protections.178 In the majority’s opinion, “[t]he phasing 
out of this clause sought to equalize treatment of copies manufactured in America and 
copies manufactured abroad” and supported a non-geographical reading.179 
In light of an increasingly globalized society and exchange of copyrighted works 
across borders, the Court “doubt[ed] that Congress would have intended to create the 
practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical interpretation would threaten 
ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities.”180 It also cited to 
Kirtsaeng amici that reported “over $2.3 trillion worth of foreign goods were imported in 
2011 [and] American retailers buy many of these goods after a first sale abroad.”181 In 
one example of potential economic impact, art museums would need to seek “permission 
from the copyright owners before they could display [a] work [first sold overseas] . . . even 
if the copyright owner has already sold or donated the work to a foreign museum.”182 
Golan and Kirtsaeng exemplify an increasingly globalized copyright jurisprudence 
                                                          
 172. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 528. 
 173. Id. at 529. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 543. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 532. 
 178. Id. at 536. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 530. 
 181. Id. at 543. 
 182. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 543–44. 
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in America. The eye toward facilitating both domestic and international trade seen in both 
cases is a stark contrast to the previous history of American copyright, since American 
copyright historically either afforded no protection or placed high demands on obtaining 
protection for foreign works.183 However, Kirtsaeng still imposed limits, and the Court 
reinforced Dastar when it included a short reference to the lack of moral rights in the 
American copyright scheme in the majority opinion: “[m]useums, for example, are not in 
the habit of asking their foreign counterparts to check with the heirs of copyright owners 
before sending, e.g., a Picasso on tour.”184 In conjunction, Dastar, Golan, and Kirtsaeng 
established the Court’s twenty-first century approach to copyright by both affirming a 
central tenet of American copyright law—the lack of moral rights—while also broadening 
the protections and exceptions of American copyright law to best function in an 
increasingly globalized society. 
CONCLUSION 
At first glance, Russian neo-classical composer Dmitri Shostakovich seems an 
unlikely player in the development of American copyright law. However, his influence 
and that of his mother country have had a significant impact on the way the United States 
provides protection for authors while incentivizing them to share their works for the 
ultimate benefit of the general public. 
Twentieth Century-Fox’s use of Shostakovich’s compositions in an American 
propaganda movie sparked one of the first American legal decisions on the topic of moral 
rights. More than sixty years later, educators’ and performers’ use of Shostakovich’s 
compositions in their businesses became a major issue in the Supreme Court’s review of 
copyright restoration. In order to ensure copyright protection and recognition for new 
American works in Russia, the United States had to do what it was notoriously loath to do: 
recognize foreign copyrights, including those from Shostakovich’s Russia. 
Congressional motivation for this restoration appears to have come at least in part 
from the concern that Russia would refuse to acknowledge American copyrights if 
America continued in its refusal to acknowledge Russian copyrights, leading toward a type 
of post-Cold War mutually assured protection between the two countries in the copyright 
arena. 
Suits involving Shostakovich first foreshadowed and later demonstrated an 
increasingly globalized approach to American copyright in the twenty-first century. Once 
Congress removed the Copyright Act’s manufacturing clause, which had severely limited 
American copyright protections for foreign works, two Supreme Court decisions cemented 
a new liberality toward international copyright: 2012’s Golan, which affirmed copyright 
restoration for previously unprotected foreign works such as Shostakovich’s compositions, 
and 2013’s Kirtsaeng, which affirmed the first sale doctrine’s applicability to domestic 
and international trade. However, even with these wide expansions of copyright 
protections, America continues to restrict American copyright guarantees to purely 
economic, rather than moral, rights. The 1948 Shostakovich New York trial court 
                                                          
 183. Golan, 565 U.S. at 309. 
 184. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 544. 
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decision, one of the first American decisions addressing the concept of moral rights, 
preceded the Supreme Court’s clear statements in 2003’s Dastar that moral rights are not 
welcome in American jurisprudence and that public domain works, once free from the 
limited monopoly of copyright protections, are thoroughly and freely usable. 
While a Russian neo-classical composer may be an unusual case study for examining 
America’s copyright system, Dmitri Shostakovich, his compositions, and his country all 
were influential in shaping various elements of American copyright law: its steadfast 
denial of moral rights, the evolution of its approach to foreign works’ protections, and the 
ongoing development and ramifications of American copyright protection. Ultimately, this 
Russian musical prodigy and the pieces he produced throughout his fifty-six-year career 
serve as a valuable case study for examining the personalities, power struggles, and stories 
at the heart of cases and controversies involving the work product of human creativity. 
—Hope Forsyth 
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